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“REVOLUTION” AT THE CAPITOL: HOW LAW HINDERED THE
RESPONSE TO THE EVENTS OF JANUARY 6, 2021
JILL I. GOLDENZIEL*
INTRODUCTION
As the horrific events of January 6, 2021, unfolded in the United States,
the Department of Defense (“DoD”) faced a firestorm of criticism for not
preventing the attacks or responding quickly enough to stop them. As fingers
pointed and leaders resigned or defended themselves, most observers
overlooked one culprit: the law. The U.S. Constitution only sparsely outlines
the relationship between civilian leadership and the military, leaving
Congress and the DoD to fill in the blanks. Together, Congress and the DoD
have created a web of statutes, regulations, and policies that generate
confusion about who bears responsibility for enforcing the law when
extraordinary emergencies occur on U.S. soil. When operating domestically,
federal troops must also work with federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies and State National Guards to create a coordinated emergency
response.1
On January 6, this complicated web of authorities and regulations
contributed to the lack of a coherent response by the DoD, National Guard,
and law enforcement to the Capitol siege. This Essay will briefly lay out the
© 2021 Jill I. Goldenziel.
* Professor of International Law and International Relations, Marine Corps UniversityCommand and Staff College (MCU-CSC). Thank you to MAJ Kevin Counce (USAR), James
Joyner, Mark Graber, Michael Pine, Bayani Smith, Maddie Young, and participants in the 2021
University of Maryland Constitutional Law Discussion Group. Special thanks to Mark Nevitt for
helpful conversations.
1. This Essay will use the term “federal troops” or “federal military” to refer to the Active
Duty U.S. military operating under their authorities in Title 10 of the U.S. Code and “federalized”
National Guard troops operating under Title 10 Status under the Command of the President rather
than state governors. See 10 U.S.C. § 12406. This term is meant to distinguish armed forces
operating under Title 10 authorities from National Guard troops. National Guard troops may
operate under two additional sets of authorities: The first is local, gubernatorial authorities paid for
by the state, wherein the Guard is acting as the successor to state militias (see 10 U.S.C. § 246).
The National Guard can also operate under “Title 32” authorities, where National Guard deployment
is authorized by the President and financed by the DoD, but the Guard remains under the control of
state governors. See generally Title 32 of U.S. Code. As this Essay will discuss, the restrictions
for Title 10 forces operating on U.S. soil are much stronger than the restrictions for National Guard
troops operating under either Title 32 status or gubernatorial control. Occasionally, the same
military commander can be “dual hatted” and operate under both Title 10 and Title 32 authorities
concurrently. See 32 U.S.C. § 325(a)(2). In this situation, different authorities would apply
depending on the activities in which that command is engaged.

336

2021]

“REVOLUTION” AT THE CAPITOL

337

relevant constitutional and statutory authorities governing the deployment of
federal troops on U.S. soil, including the Posse Comitatus Act, the
Insurrection Act, and Defense Support for Civil Authorities.2 It will then
explain how these authorities hindered the DoD’s response to the events of
January 6, and how available authorities might have led to a different
response by the DoD, and by President Trump as Commander-in-Chief.3 A
complete discussion of how these laws and regulations should be reformed
lies beyond the scope of this Essay. However, viewing these laws and
regulations in light of the events of January 6 highlights gaps and loopholes
that must be closed to prevent another national emergency.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITIES
Constitutional text regarding the relationship between the military and
civilian leadership is sparse. Fear of standing armies was fresh in the minds
of the Framers of the Constitution following British colonization, causing the
Framers to hotly debate the creation of a standing army.4 The Framers
ultimately reached a constitutional compromise to install the President as
Commander-in-Chief and place the power to fund the military in Congress.5
Further limiting both branches’ power, any funds would be appropriated only
for a period of two years, ensuring time for civilians to vote out lawmakers
who did not agree with their views of military funding.6
The Civil War, perhaps the United States’ greatest “constitutional
revolution,” led to significant changes in civil-military relations. During
Reconstruction, distrust of the federal military remained high in the South.
Former Confederate states detested that federal troops were sent to perform
police actions and enforce federal laws within their states.7 This issue came
to a head in the contested presidential election of 1876 when the federal
military was ordered to protect the voting rights of black freedmen in the
South.8 Southern Democrats claimed that the military intimidated or blocked
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.KENT L. REV. 103 (2000) (emphasizing the creation of the Second Amendment as responsive to
deep fear of a standing army); see also The Federalist No. 29, at 178 (Alexander Hamilton) (Project
Gutenberg 1998) (arguing that a standing army is “dangerous to liberty”).
5. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (“The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o raise and
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years.”).
6. Id.
7. See John Copeland Nagle, How Not to Count Votes, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1732, 1749 (2004)
(noting this is the popular version of the story of the 1876 election, although contested); for a
somewhat different version, see ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE: THE STORY OF EMANCIPATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 190–98 (2006).
8. See Nagle, supra note 7, at 1749.
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Samuel Tilden’s supporters from voting.9 To end the controversy, Democrats
agreed to concede victory to Rutherford B. Hayes on the condition that
Republicans withdrew the military from the South, among other demands.10
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act (“PCA”) in
1878,11 which established a general rule barring federal troops from engaging
in direct law enforcement actions on U.S. soil.12 While the original text of
the PCA applied only to the Army and Air Force, it has been extended by
revisions and DoD directives to all branches of the federal military, including
the National Guard when federalized (but not when under gubernatorial
control or pursuant to “Title 32 authorities,” meaning under the control of
state governors but federally funded by DoD).13
Generally speaking, the PCA prohibits federal troops from providing
direct support to law enforcement. Direct engagement in traditional law
enforcement functions by federal troops violates the PCA.14 These functions
might include arrest, seizure of evidence, search of a person, search of a
building, investigation of a crime, interviewing witnesses, pursuit of an
escaped prisoner, and search of an area for a suspect.15 Providing tactical
advice or logistical support may violate the PCA if its use pervades the
activities of the law enforcement officials when the advice or support
materially contributes to the operation.16 Indirect support, such as providing
military supplies and equipment, is permitted.17 Passive activities, such as
the mere presence of military personnel; advice or recommendations given
to civilian law enforcement on tactics/logistics; delivery of military material,
equipment, or supplies; and aerial reconnaissance flights, do not violate the
PCA.18
The PCA also permits the Secretary of Defense to make available any
equipment, base facility, or research facility of the DoD to any law
enforcement official for law enforcement purposes.19 DoD personnel may
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1385; see also Mark P. Nevitt, Unintended Consequences: The Posse
Comitatus Act in the Modern Era, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 119, 135 (2014).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1385. The PCA was amended most recently in 1994.
13. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 5525.5, DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICIALS (Jan. 15, 1986) (extending the PCA to the Navy and Marine Corps). The Coast Guard
is exempt from the PCA because it is considered to be a federal law enforcement agency and part
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
14. See United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D. 1976), aff’d sub. nom. United
States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976).
15. United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 925 (D.S.D. 1975).
16. United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1380–81 (D. Neb. 1974).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 10 U.S.C. § 272.
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train civilian law enforcement officials in the operation and maintenance of
equipment and provide expert advice.20 DoD personnel may operate the
equipment for purposes of monitoring air and sea traffic or traffic outside
U.S. territory, aerial reconnaissance, and interception of vessels or aircraft
detected outside of the United States.21
A. Exception to the Posse Comitatus Act: The Insurrection Act
The Insurrection Act of 1807, which grants the President authority to
deploy the federal military and federalize National Guard troops during an
insurrection, presents the biggest exception to the PCA.22 The two acts must
be read in tandem. Initially, the PCA was designed to place bounds on the
Insurrection Act.23 However, because the Insurrection Act has been used so
rarely in American history, the PCA functionally serves as the general rule
and the Insurrection Act as its primary exception. Although both acts have
been revised over time to limit the President’s authority to deploy federal
troops on U.S. soil, the President’s power to do so remains very broad.
The President may invoke the Insurrection Act upon the request of a
state governor or unilaterally. A governor may request that the President
invoke the Act to protect a state against domestic violence.24 The President
may invoke the Act without a governor’s request if the state government is
unwilling or unable to ensure respect for federal law, including constitutional
rights for its citizens.25 Alternatively, the President may unilaterally invoke
the Act and use federal forces to perform law enforcement activities in
situations of “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or
rebellion against the authority of the United States.”26 The Act also
authorizes the President to use federal forces to “restore public order and
enforce the laws of the United States when, as a result of a natural disaster,
epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or
incident, or other condition,” the state authorities are incapable of
maintaining public order and the domestic violence either (1) results in a
deprivation of constitutional rights or (2) “opposes or obstructs the execution
of the laws of the United States.”27
20. Id.
21. Id. at § 273.
22. Id. at §§ 331–335.
23. See Lisa Grow Sun, Disaster Mythology and the Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1131, 1163
(2011) (recounting Congress’s amendment of the Insurrection Act in 2006 because of fears that the
Insurrection Act limited the President’s ability to use the military on U.S. soil in case of natural
disasters).
24. 10 U.S.C. § 331.
25. Id. at § 333.
26. Id. at § 332.
27. Id. at § 333.
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The text of the Insurrection Act leaves considerable room for
interpretation. The Insurrection Act does not define the terms “unlawful
obstructions,” “combinations,” “assemblages,” or “rebellion against the
authority of the United States.”28 Congress has never specified the severity
of the events required to trigger invocation of the Act. The Act does not
provide for judicial review, and no President has been brought to court for
invoking the Insurrection Act. Accordingly, judicial interpretation of these
terms as applied to the Act is largely absent.29 The Act also requires that the
President issue a proclamation ordering insurgents to disperse before
invoking the Act.30 The duration of time necessary to allow insurgents to
disperse has not been interpreted by Congress or the courts.
The Insurrection Act presents a powerful tool for the President to deploy
the military on U.S. soil. Despite the Act’s potential for abuse of power, U.S.
Presidents have invoked the Insurrection Act infrequently throughout
American history. As a norm, Presidents prefer to defer to governors’
requests before doing so. In the last century, the Act has been used primarily
to help integrate public schools and control race-related unrest. Its last use
was in 1992, when the Governor of California requested that President
George H.W. Bush send in federal troops to help stop riots that erupted in
downtown Los Angeles after policemen were acquitted of the brutal beating
of Rodney King.31 In 2005, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, President
George W. Bush famously refused to invoke the Insurrection Act without the
Louisiana Governor’s permission.32
B. Partial Exception to the Posse Comitatus Act: Defense Support of
Civil Authorities
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (“DSCA”) is the DoD’s term for
support from the DoD that is requested by federal, state, or local civilian
authorities. DSCA requests must be made by the President, Secretary of
Defense, civil authorities, or qualifying entities.33 DoD support under DSCA
28. Id. at § 332.
29. Law Professor Steve Vladeck has questioned the constitutionality of the Insurrection Act
itself. See Steve Vladeck, Under the Insurrection Act of 1807, Here’s What a U.S. President Can
and
Cannot
Do,
WASH.
POST
(June
19,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/19/under-insurrection-act-1807-heres-what-uspresident-can-cannot-do/.
30. 10 U.S.C. § 334.
31. See Sean McGrane, Note, Katrina, Federalism, and Military Law Enforcement: A New
Exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1323–24 (2010) (discussing
instances of invocation of the Insurrection Act).
32. Id. at 1309 (detailing the episode of President George W. Bush deciding not to invoke the
Insurrection Act in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina).
33. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 3025.18(4)(c), DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES
(DSCA) (Mar. 19, 2018) [hereinafter DoDD 3025.18 (DSCA)].
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may also include federalized National Guard forces, or federal military and
non-military DoD personnel and assets. Reasons for support may include
domestic emergencies, cyberspace incident response, law enforcement
support, and other domestic activities, or requests from qualifying entities for
special events. DSCA allows support to prepare, prevent, protect, respond,
and recover from domestic incidents.34
Legal authorities for DSCA emanate from a variety of statutory
authorities and two main DoD Instructions and Directives.35 Most DSCA
activities, like providing immediate disaster relief in the wake of a hurricane,
fall outside the scope of the PCA. The most common statute authorizing
DSCA is the Stafford Act.36 The Stafford Act permits the military to support
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other federal
agencies to provide humanitarian assistance in the event of a natural
disaster.37 The military’s role is thus limited to supporting the civilian
response.38 Most Stafford Act activities fall outside the scope of the PCA.
However, the DoD Directives covering DSCA include authorizations
for activities that could be exceptions to the PCA in an emergency. These
authorizations include the Immediate Response Authority (“IRA”) and the
Emergency Response Authority (“ERA”) delegated to federal military
commanders.39 Pursuant to the DSCA Directive, the DoD has the IRA and
ERA (also called “emergency authority” in the DSCA Directive) to support
civilian law enforcement when requested by a local civilian authority.40 IRA
can be requested “under imminently serious conditions and if time does not
permit approval from higher authority” to “temporarily employ[] the
resources under their control, subject to any supplemental direction provided
by higher headquarters, to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate
great property damage within the United States.”41

34. Id. at para. (4)(f). DSCA also covers DoD’s counterdrug activities. Although the DoD is
the lead federal agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs
into the United States, these DoD activities are conducted in support of civilian law enforcement.
See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-28, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES, at III-7
(Oct. 29, 2018) [hereinafter JP 3-28].
35. DoDD 3025.18 (DSCA), supra note 33; DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 3025.21, DEFENSE
SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (Feb. 8, 2019). Any provision by the
military of direct support for law enforcement under DSCA is required by law to have a statutory
basis. DoDD 3025.18 (DSCA), supra note 33.
36. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (“Stafford Act”)
Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. DoDD 3025.18 (DSCA), supra note 33.
40. Id.
41. Id. at para. 4(i).
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Authority for the IRA and ERA is delegated to federal military
commanders.42 In practice, this means that the mayor of a city ravaged by a
flash flood could call her local military base to request immediate assistance,
and the commander of that base would have the authority to respond under
the IRA without seeking higher approval. However, the same mayor could
also request assistance to suppress protests that may be peaceful or that could
be better handled by state law enforcement, federal law enforcement, or
National Guard troops.
Beyond this broad text, the precise scope of “immediate response
authority” is unclear. Moreover, statutory authorization for the IRA is
unclear. The Joint Publication for DSCA cites authorization for both the IRA
and ERA under the Stafford Act.43 However, the Stafford Act does not
expressly include such an authorization. Moreover, by the text of the DSCA
Directive, IRA activities are not limited to activities authorized under the
Stafford Act.44 The authorities delegated to individual federal military
commanders are thus vague and potentially far-reaching.
The IRA includes some checks upon potential military overreach. It
does not permit actions that would subject civilians to the use of military
power that is regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory.45 Any
decision to provide resources under the IRA requires notification to the
National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center, which will, in turn, inform
the appropriate DoD Components, including the relevant Combatant
Command and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Global Security.46 Also, support under the IRA may ordinarily
only last seventy-two hours.47 DoD commanders must reassess whether there
remains an extended need for assistance.48
The scope of DSCA’s Emergency Response Authority is similarly
vague. The Directive states:
[I]n extraordinary emergency circumstances where prior
authorization by the President is impossible and duly constituted
local authorities are unable to control the situation, to engage
temporarily in activities that are necessary to quell large-scale,
unexpected civil disturbances because:

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
JP 3-28, supra note 34.
DoDD 3025.18 (DSCA), supra note 33.
JP 3-28, supra note 34.
DoDD 3025.18 (DSCA), supra note 33, at para. 4(i)(4).
Id. at para. 4(i)(5).
Id.
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(1) Such activities are necessary to prevent significant loss of
life or wanton destruction of property and are necessary to
restore governmental function and public order; or,
(2) When duly constituted Federal, State, or local authorities
are unable or decline to provide adequate protection for
Federal property or Federal governmental functions. Federal
action, including the use of Federal military forces, is
authorized when necessary to protect the Federal property or
functions.49
The authorization of the federal military to quell large, dangerous,
destructive public disturbances implies that federal troops will be engaging
in direct law enforcement activities. Yet elsewhere in the text of the DSCA
Directive, federal troops are not authorized to engage directly in law
enforcement.50 Congress has not explicitly created a statutory exception to
the PCA that would allow federal troops to directly support law enforcement
under the DSCA. Only the use of the ERA to protect federal property or
federal government functions is considered an authorized constitutional
exception to the PCA.51
II. APPLICATION TO THE EVENTS OF JANUARY 6, 2021
Unclarities in the Posse Comitatus Act, Insurrection Act, and related
authorities contributed to the military’s delayed response to the events of
January 6, 2021. Facts surrounding the events of January 6 are still unfolding
as of this writing. Below is a brief sketch of the events according to the DoD
timeline released on January 8, 2021.52
Following President Donald Trump’s defeat in the 2020 elections, he
and his supporters began calling for protests to stop congressional
certification of the electoral college votes on January 6. On December 31,
2020, the Mayor of Washington, D.C., Muriel Bowser, requested that D.C.
National Guard (“DCNG”) troops be deployed to support the D.C. police
during the planned protests.53 The Acting Secretary of Defense authorized
340 troops on January 4, 2021.54 On January 6, the Metropolitan Police

49. Id. at para. 4(k).
50. Id. (noting that “[f]ederal military forces shall not be used to quell civil disturbances unless
specifically authorized by the President,” referencing Chapter 13 of Reference (d)).
51. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4 (2017).
52. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Planning and Execution Timeline for the National Guard’s Involvement
in the January 6, 2021 Violent Attack at the U.S. Capitol (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/11/2002563151/-1/-1/0/PLANNING-AND-EXECUTIONTIMELINE-FOR-THE-NATIONAL-GUARDS-INVOLVEMENT-IN-THE-JANUARY-6-2021VIOLENT-ATTACK-AT-THE-US-CAPITOL.PDF [hereinafter DoD Timeline].
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Department of D.C. (“MPD”) would be responsible for the city streets of the
National Mall and Capitol area; U.S. Park Police would be responsible for
the site of Trump’s speech and rally; Secret Service would be responsible for
the White House premises; and Capitol Police would be responsible for the
Capitol itself.55 These assignments represented the usual jurisdictions for
these agencies. Capitol Police were not prepared with additional staffing nor
equipped with riot gear. In a letter to the Department of Justice, Mayor
Bowser also made clear that she was not requesting support from federal law
enforcement.56
Neither the Capitol Police nor the D.C. Mayor requested additional
support from the DoD. On January 3, 2021, the Pentagon confirmed with the
Capitol Police that there was no request for DoD support.57 On January 4,
the Capitol Police again confirmed this in a phone call with the Secretary of
the Army. On January 5, Mayor Bowser informed the Acting Attorney
General, Acting Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army that
there were no additional support requirements from the District of
Columbia.58
On January 6, 2021, a large group gathered outside the White House and
the Capitol to protest the results of the 2020 presidential election and
Congress’s certification of the vote. During a “March to Save America” rally
that took place in the Ellipse outside the White House, President Trump
instructed the group to march to the Capitol to press Congress not to certify
electoral votes. Around 1:00 PM, hundreds of protesters marched to the
Capitol, pushing through protective barriers and past Capitol Police.59
Capitol Police requested reinforcement from MPD, who arrived shortly after
the request. At 1:09 PM, the Capitol Police Chief asked the Sergeant-atArms of the Senate and House to declare an emergency in order to call in the
DCNG.60 The Capitol Police commander formally declared a riot at 1:50
PM. Capitol Police and MPD were unable to control the rioters, and around

55. Greg Myre, Where Was Security When a Pro-Trump Mob Stormed the Capitol?, NPR (Jan.
7,
2021,
10:33
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/insurrection-at-thecapitol/2021/01/07/954349992/where-was-the-security-when-a-mob-stormed-the-capitol.
56. Mayor Muriel Bowser (@MayorBowser), TWITTER (Jan. 5, 2021, 1:53 PM),
https://twitter.com/MayorBowser/status/1346530358674792466/photo/1.
57. DoD Timeline, supra note 52.
58. Id.
59. Lisa Mascaro, Ben Fox & Lolita C. Baldor, ‘Clear the Capitol,’ Pence Pleaded, Timeline
of Riot Shows, AP NEWS (Apr. 10, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/capitol-siege-army-racialinjustice-riots-only-on-ap-480e95d9d075a0a946e837c3156cdcb9; Carol D. Leonnig et al.,
Outgoing Capitol Police Chief: House, Senate Security Officials Hamstrung Efforts to Call in
National Guard (Jan. 10, 2021, 11:38 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/sund-riotnational-guard/2021/01/10/fc2ce7d4-5384-11eb-a817-e5e7f8a406d6_story.html.
60. Leonnig et al., supra note 59.
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2:00 PM, the rioters breached the Capitol through broken windows.61 Some
rioters were equipped with riot gear, weapons, body armor, and plastic
handcuffs. Both the House and Senate evacuated at 1:26 PM, and
immediately thereafter, the rioters entered the chamber.62
At 1:49 PM, the Capitol Police Chief requested DCNG assistance,
which was approved by the Acting Secretary of Defense at 3:04 PM.63
Members of the DCNG arrived at the Capitol at 5:40 PM.64 At 5:45 PM, the
Acting Secretary of Defense approved out-of-state National Guard forces to
deploy to D.C. to stop the protestors.65
A. How the Law Hindered the Response to the January 6 Riots
Once the siege began, the D.C. Mayor had no direct authority to call out
the DCNG. Because D.C. is not a state, the Mayor does not have direct
authority over the DCNG the way a state governor would. Ordinarily, state
National Guards report to the governors of their states until and unless they
are federalized. Since D.C. has no governor, Congress instead made the
President the Commander in Chief of the DCNG, whether or not it is
federalized.66 The Guard is always federally funded. The DCNG is
considered to be operating as a “militia” on behalf of the District unless it is
federalized. This terminology is legal fiction, since the President has
commanding authority of the Guard in either case.
This legal peculiarity translates into immense power for the President to
use the National Guard for law enforcement purposes within D.C. and creates
a complicated web of legal authorities and chain of command that delayed
the Pentagon’s response to the events of January 6. The chain of command
from the White House to the DCNG has several layers. Pursuant to Executive
Order 11,485, the Secretary of Defense, under the direction of the President,
may order out the DCNG to assist D.C. civil authorities in accordance with
the D.C. Code—itself enacted by Congress.67 The Executive Order further
delegates the President’s authority over the DCNG to the Secretary of
Defense while operating in militia status.68 A DoD memorandum further
delegates this authority to the Secretary of the Army for the D.C. Army
National Guard, and the Secretary of the Air Force for the D.C. Air National

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
DoD Timeline, supra note 52.
Id.
Id.
Id.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 49-409 (West 2021).
Exec. Order No. 11,485, 34 Fed. Reg. 15,411 (Jan. 3, 1969).
Id.
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Guard.69 The Secretaries exercise this authority through the Commanding
General of the DCNG, who is appointed by the President. The Commanding
General fulfills the same role as the Adjutant General of a state National
Guard and commands the DCNG in practice. If the D.C. Mayor should wish
to request support from the DCNG for law enforcement or any other purpose,
she may not do so directly. Instead, she must submit a request to the
Commanding General, who would then notify the Secretary of the Army.70
This chain of command means that neither the D.C. Mayor, nor any
other D.C. official, has authority to call up the Guard. Under Executive Order
11,485, the Secretary of Defense, subject to the direction of the President,
may order out the National Guard to aid D.C.’s civil authorities.71 The D.C.
Mayor can submit a request for civil support from the Guard to the
Commanding General, who notifies the Secretary of the Army.72
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has asserted that the DCNG can be
used for law enforcement purposes not subject to the PCA because the DCNG
is operating as the District’s “militia” unless it is explicitly federalized.73
This would mean, in effect, that the DCNG would operate like State National
Guards while under state control, when State National Guards are operating
under Title 32.74 It is unclear whether DOJ’s position is legally permissible,
considering that the DCNG is always federalized and under the control of the
Secretary of the Army and the President. Accordingly, some scholars
maintain the opposite view: that the DCNG is always under federal control,
and thus is always subject to the PCA.75 Furthermore, the language of DSCA
explicitly applies the Directive to “Army National Guard . . . personnel when
under Federal command and control,”76 which would, by its own language,
apply to the DCNG. The DOJ’s interpretation effectively means that the

69. Supervision and Control of the National Guard of the District of Columbia, 34 Fed. Reg.
15,411, 15,443 (Oct. 1, 1969).
70. D.C. CODE ANN. § 49-403 (West 2021) (authorizing requests for support involving riots or
unrest); D.C. CODE ANN. § 49-404 (West 2021) (authorizing support for other requests).
71. Exec. Order 11,485, 34 Fed. Reg. at 15,411.
72. D.C. CODE ANN. § 49-403 (West 2021); D.C. CODE ANN. § 49-404 (West 2021).
73. Use of the Nat’l Guard to Support Drug Interdiction Efforts in D.C., 13 Op. O.L.C. 91, 92
(1989) (“Since by its terms the Posse Comitatus Act applies only to the use of the Army or the Air
Force, it applies to a National Guard only when it has been put into federal service as part of the
Army or Air Force. Since the described use for the District of Columbia National Guard would be
for it in its militia rather than federal service capacity, it is not prohibited by the Posse Comitatus
Act.”).
74. Id.
75. Elizabeth Goitein & Joseph Nunn, Why D.C.’s Mayor Should Have Authority over the D.C.
National Guard, JUST SEC. (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/74098/why-d-c-s-mayorshould-have-authority-over-the-d-c-national-guard/.
76. DoDD 3025.18 (DSCA), supra note 33, para. 2(b).
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President can use the DCNG for law enforcement purposes, within the
District, without the Insurrection Act or other statutory authorities.77
The D.C. Mayor’s lack of control over the DCNG hindered the response
of the full DCNG to assist the Capitol Police and MPD on January 6. Under
the DOJ’s interpretation that the DCNG need only follow the PCA when
formally federalized, the DCNG was permitted to participate in law
enforcement. Thus, the DCNG could have secured the perimeter, made
arrests, and engaged in other law enforcement activities in support of the
MPD and Capitol Police on January 6. Unfortunately, no D.C. official was
able to order them out to do so. Hours passed before the Pentagon granted
authorization for full DCNG deployment that Mayor Bowser would have
been able to grant herself if she had been governor of a state.
Without the authority to call up the DCNG, the D.C. Mayor requested
assistance from other states’ National Guards under the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (“EMAC”).78 EMAC is a congressionally
ratified agreement between the fifty states, D.C., Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands that permits deployment of
National Guard troops across jurisdictions to respond to emergencies.79 The
D.C. Mayor, not the President, has the authority to request assistance under
EMAC.
Unlike National Guard troops operating in their own states, out-of-state
National Guard troops deployed under EMAC are subject to the PCA, which
prevents them from engaging in law enforcement activities while deployed
for assistance.80 The National Guard units authorized from New Jersey,
Delaware, New York, and Pennsylvania to assist during the declared
emergency in D.C. were thus unable to directly participate in law
enforcement activities.81 Deployment of out-of-state National Guard units to
be used in D.C. requires approval from the Pentagon before entering D.C. or
before deploying on federal property, creating an additional layer of approval
before these guardsmen could help secure D.C.82

77. Goitein & Nunn, supra note 75.
78. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 (1996)
[hereinafter EMAC].
79. Id.
80. Id. at art. XIII.
81. Article XIII of EMAC also seemingly prohibits its use in any situation where the President
would be authorized to invoke the Insurrection Act. Id. Since the President could have invoked the
Insurrection Act, it is unclear whether it was legal to send out-of-state National Guards through
EMAC.
82. Mark Nevitt, Tragedy at the Capitol: Four Questions that Demand Answers, JUST SEC.
(Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/74121/tragedy-at-the-capitol-four-questions-thatdemand-answers/.
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B. Other Options for Responding to the January 6 Riots
The Pentagon might also have responded to the Capitol siege using
DSCA. However, doing so would have created concerns about the norm of
civilian control over the military. As noted above, in extraordinary
emergency circumstances where prior authorization by the President is
impossible and local authorities are unable to control the situation, DSCA’s
emergency response authority permits federal military commanders to
temporarily engage in activities that are necessary to quell unexpected civil
disturbances and restore governmental function or public order.83 It also
permits federal military commanders, in such extraordinary circumstances,
to protect federal property or functions.84 The January 6 attack on the Capitol
likely met the level of civil disturbance required. However, authorization by
the President as the events were unfolding was not “impossible.” Even if it
were, as the shocking events unfolded, no one in the chain of command may
have been willing or able to determine that the Commander-in-Chief could
not possibly make such an authorization. Thus, it would have been difficult
for federal military commanders to use this provision to override presidential
consent, had it existed.
DSCA’s immediate response authority may have permitted an
immediate response to “save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great
property damage within the United States.”85 Although the IRA is typically
used for large-scale natural disasters, the Capitol attacks might have
qualified, given their prominence and the potential for damage to the home
of the legislative branch. However, the only requests to DoD by qualifying
authorities during the Capitol attacks were for National Guard troops, not
federal military forces. Pentagon officials likely respected the norm of
deference to requests from qualifying authorities.
It does not appear that the D.C. Mayor, law enforcement, or qualifying
authorities ever requested the assistance of federal military troops on January
6. The official DoD timeline of events on January 6 discusses only requests
for DCNG and National Guard troops from other states.86 In the absence of
these requests, it is unclear under what authorities the Pentagon could have
provided additional federal military support on January 6. These unclear
authorities, combined with the Pentagon’s norm of hesitancy to deploy
federal troops on domestic soil, likely hampered the federal military’s
response on January 6.

83.
84.
85.
86.

DoDD 3025.18 (DSCA), supra note 33, at para. 4(k).
Id. at para. 4(k)(2).
Id. at para. 4(i).
See DoD Timeline, supra note 52.
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CONCLUSION
Thus, the constitutional and statutory framework surrounding the
deployment of the military on U.S. soil may have played a significant role in
hindering the military’s response on January 6.87 The layers of bureaucracy
necessary to deploy the National Guard to our nation’s capital to protect the
Capitol building likely hindered the response as well.88
As the historical record shows, and as the events of January 6 illustrate,
deployment of the federal military on U.S. soil is a matter that is not taken
lightly by Pentagon leadership or by the American public. Historically, the
American public has been very resistant to the use of federal troops on U.S.
soil. In most cases, the law is clear in permitting federal troops to be used
domestically, primarily in humanitarian emergencies—and even then,
usually at the request of state governors. The law proscribes the use of federal
troops for law enforcement purposes in most instances. Norms and public
disapproval have kept the biggest exception to this rule, the Insurrection Act,
from being invoked very often.
In emergency situations, where leaders are prone to hit the panic button,
Americans often look to the military as a savior. On January 6, congressional
leaders were no exception. Speaker Nancy Pelosi called the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff during the January 6 siege to seek help, even though the
Chairman is outside the military chain of command.89 Senate Minority
Leader Chuck Schumer also called the Pentagon.90 Vice President Mike
Pence demanded that the Acting Secretary of Defense “Clear the Capitol.”91
But for many reasons, including the existing patchwork of legal authorities,
the military could not save them. As discussed above, the law places
significant constraints on the ability of federal troops to respond to domestic
emergencies. Sometimes, constraints on the use of the federal military on
U.S. soil exist to preserve important constitutional law and norms. However,
legal authorities surrounding the use of the D.C. National Guard hardly serve
such a purpose—and may have prevented a quicker military response at the
Capitol on January 6.
As the law stands, the President can use the Insurrection Act to deploy
federal troops on U.S. soil and directly command the D.C. National Guard.
President Trump, as Commander-in-Chief, could have quickly ordered
federal troops to the Capitol on January 6. If the President had given such
orders, the response would have changed constitutional norms of civil87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section III.A.
Mascaro et al., supra note 59.
Id.
Id.
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military relations in the United States forever—no matter what he ordered
them to do once there. Given the current state of the law, perhaps the greatest
constitutional revolution at the Capitol on January 6 is the one that did not
occur.

